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Abstract
We study a condition of favoring cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game on complex
networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a
benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive the benefit b. The
game is a death-birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought
that b/c > 〈k〉 is a condition of favoring cooperation [1], we find that b/c > 〈knn〉 is
the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular,
random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free
network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network where network size is
infinite, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network
heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of a game, although it is occasionally
believed that scale-free networks favor cooperation irrespective of game structures. If the
number of players are small, then the cooperation is favored in scale-free networks.
Keywords: Games, Cooperation, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Complex Networks
1. Introduction
Although a player incurs a lot of cost for cooperative behavior and being selfish is usually
more beneficial than being cooperative as one player, cooperative behavior is ubiquitously
observed in various forms of life system including even single cell. Cooperation is even the
basis of life system, eco-system, and animal society including human being. Thereby, the
research on how cooperation emerges and being enhanced have attracted much attention
[2] in game theory. To answer the question Prisoner’s Dilemma game is often used, in
which being defector is always better off than being cooperator and, however, both of the
players being cooperators are always better off than both of them being defectors. This
game structure reflects the situation of interest in reality.
The seminal paper [3] introduced a spatial structure in the game theory and showed
that a lattice structure enhanced cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Since then, it
has been well recognized that the spatial structure is one factor affecting the emergence
of cooperation and thus a lot of effort has been made in this direction [4–16]. In contrast,
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cooperation is often inhibited by spatial structure in snow drift games [17]. The spatial
structure is regarded as a network. Many networks in reality are not often regular lattice;
rather, they are often small-world; scale-free; or heterogenous heterogeneous networks.
It has also been recognized that underlying network structures crucially determine an
outcome of the models such as percolation, synchronization, epidemic spread, the Ising ,
voter, and a lot of other models [18, 19]. Thereby, many researchers have expressed interest
in games on such complex networks recently (see review [20]) and explored especially how
network structures such as the small-world characteristics, the scale-freeness, the network
heterogeneity, and so on, affect the emergence of cooperation. For instance, Refs. [21–
23] showed that the scale-free network enhanced cooperation. Contrary to them, in the
present paper we will conclude for the Prisoner’s Dilemma model defined in section 2 that
cooperation is inhibited by scale-free or heterogeneous network and enhanced by regular
network, agreeing with Refs. [3, 24].
The review [2] entitled “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation” listed five mecha-
nisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity,
network reciprocity, and group selection. We will show that the condition of favoring co-
operation exactly corresponds to the network reciprocity of the five mechanisms. More
specifically, the condition is b/c > 〈knn〉 for general uncorrelated networks (in which the
degree and the nearest neighbor degree do not correlate), where b and c are the benefit
and the cost of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and 〈knn〉 is the mean degree of the nearest
neighbors. Although many preceding researches are numerical simulations, we will analyt-
ically derive the condition by using pair approximation and mean-field approximation in
heterogenous networks.
Previously, however, it was widely believed for the same model that the general condi-
tion for favoring cooperation is b/c > 〈k〉 [1] (and reviews [2, 20]), where 〈k〉 is the mean
degree. The point here is the difference between 〈knn〉 and 〈k〉. The difference is essential
in network theory, producing interesting results in complex networks; see Refs. [25–27]. It
is not too much to say that owing to the difference network theory can exist. If a network
has no degree-degree correlation, then 〈knn〉 = 〈k
2〉/〈k〉. The probability that an end of a
link is attached to a vertex with degree k, Pnn(k), is given by
Pnn(k) =
# Ends attached to vertices with degree k
# All the ends of links in the network
=
NkP (k)
N
∑
k kP (k)
, (1)
where P (k) is the degree distribution. Therefore, we have
〈knn〉 ≡
∑
k
kPnn(k)
=
∑
k k
2P (k)∑
k′ k
′P (k′)
=
〈k2〉
〈k〉
. (2)
The present paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we will explain the model. From
section 3 to 6, we will derive the condition. In section 7 we will give an intuition why
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b/c > 〈knn〉 is the condition. In section 10 we will confirm the condition by numerical
simulations. Finally, we will conclude in section 11.
2. Model
Let us introduce the model. We consider two kinds of players: cooperators (C) and
defectors (D). Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, while defectors
only receive the benefit. The game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. The payoff matrix
of the game is given by
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
. (3)
The game proceeds as follows. (See also Fig. 1.)
C
D
D D
C C
C
2b
3b - 3c
b
2b - 3c
?
D
D D
C C
C
2b
3b - 3c
b
2b - 3c
C
D
D D
C C
C
2b
D
D
D D
C C
C
Figure 1: An example of the update rule of the game on a network.
At each time step, a randomly selected player dies. The adjacent players compete for the
empty vertex, occupying it with a probability proportional to their fitness defined below;
this is called the death-birth process. There is another interpretation of an evolutionary
game [28]. At each time step, an player is randomly chosen and updates his strategy by
imitating his neighbors’ strategy with a probability proportional to their payoff. We can
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thereby regard the model as a model of human behavior, which is called imitation dynamics
in social sciences.
The fitness of each player F is given by the sum of constant term, the baseline fitness
1 − w and the payoff from the game P multiplied by w; namely, F = 1 − w + wP . We
set w ≪ 1, which is called weak selection. Then the probabilities of strategies change only
slowly.
In Fig. 1, for example, the total payoff of cooperators around the randomly chosen
shaded vertex is FC = 2− 2w + w(5b− 6c), while that of defectors is FD = 2− 2w + 3wb.
The central randomly chosen player will be updated to a cooperator with the probability
FC/(FC + FD) and to be a defector with the probability FD/(FC + FD).
The update rule is a replicator dynamics extended to a network. If a network is com-
plete, it is equivalent to a replicator dynamics:
d
dt
pi = wpi(Pi − P¯ ), (4)
where pi is the probability of strategy i, Pi is the mean payoff from the game of the player
adopting strategy i, and P¯ is the mean payoff from the game over all players. This is called
replicator equation on graphs [29].
In the following, we explain the criterion whether a network favors cooperation or
not. As the initial condition, we prepare a network in which all the vertices are occupied
by defectors only. Next, we replace one of them by a single cooperator and run the
evolutionary games until all the vertices are occupied either by only defectors, or by only
cooperators. There are only two terminal states: one is that the whole network is occupied
by cooperators only and the other is that it is occupied by defectors only. We iterate the
same game a number of times and obtain the probability that only cooperators occupy the
vertices. This probability is called the fixation probability ρC [30]. If the selection neither
favors nor opposes cooperation, the fixation probability ρC is 1/N , where N is the network
size, because the density of the cooperators in the initial condition is 1/N . If the fixation
probability ρC is larger than 1/N , we say that the network structure favors cooperation,
and vice versa.
We want to know the dynamics of the probability of cooperators pC. However, we first
study the more general problem of the following payoff matrix with strategy A and B:
(A B
A x y
B z s
)
. (5)
A player is set on each vertex and plays games with its neighbors only. We consider
a network without degree-degree correlations. We want to know the dynamics of the
probability distribution of cooperators pC. However, we first study the problem of the
general setting in Eq. (5), and then of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Let N(k) denote the
number of vertices with degree k and let P (k) denote degree distribution. Let Pnn(knn)
denote the probability that an adjacent vertex has degree knn; Pnn(knn) is the degree
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distribution of nearest neighbors, which is different from the degree distribution P (k). Let
pX(k) denote the probability of strategy X on a vertex with degree k. We use the pair
approximation [31]. Let qX|Y (knn, k) denote the conditional probability of finding an X-
player, given that the adjacent vertex is occupied by a Y -player, and that the degrees of
the X-player and the Y -player are knn and k, respectively. For example, the probability
that a randomly chosen vertex is a Y -player with degree k and a next neighboring vertex
is a X-player with degree knn is pY (k)P (k)qX|Y (knn, k)Pnn(knn) in pair approximation.
We now provide the outline of derivation. We need to know the dynamics of pA, where
pA is the probability of strategy A in the whole network. For this purpose, we also need the
dynamics of the conditional probabilities such as qA|A(knn, k). As such, we first calculate
p˙A(k), and then calculate q˙A|A(knn, k). Then, we calculate the fixation probability ρA by
a diffusion approximation. The terminal state of the probability pA is either 1 or 0 only
and the fixation probability of strategy A, ρA, is the probability that pA reaches 1 in one
game. At the final stage, we substitute the payoff matrix (5) with the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (3), and then we have the condition of favoring cooperation b/c > 〈knn〉.
We will follow the derivation of Ref. [1]. The difference is that we consider the het-
erogeneity of degree distribution explicitly. Therefore, a probability of strategy and a
conditional probability depend on the degree k and nearest neighbor degree knn, so that
we write them as pX(k) and qX|Y (knn, k) as defined above. In addition, in order to deal
with a heterogenous network we use a mean-field approximation for network structure
that we will explain in the following. As a result of the mean-field approximation we will
have two kinds of the probability of strategy pX and p
nn
X , and two kinds of the conditional
probability qX|Y and q
nn
X|Y . The definitions will be given below.
In the mean-field approximation for a heterogenous network structure, the degree of a
vertex adjacent to any randomly chosen vertex is replaced by the mean degree of nearest
neighbors 〈knn〉 as illustrated in Fig. 2(a). Subsequently, a vertex with degree 〈knn〉 is
also surrounded by vertices with degree 〈knn〉 as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). Further, a degree
of any randomly chosen vertex is replaced by the mean degree 〈k〉. Thus, in the mean-
field approximation the probability of strategy A on a randomly chosen vertex is given by
pA(〈k〉), and the probability of strategy A on a neighbor of a randomly chosen vertex is
given by pA(〈knn〉).
3. Dynamics of probability of strategy
First, we study the case where a B-player with degree k is randomly chosen with
probability pB(k)P (k) and changes the strategy from B to A, and consequently pA increases
by 1/N(k). Because we need pA(〈k〉) and pA(〈knn〉), we compute pA(k) first and then
substitute 〈k〉 and 〈knn〉 later on.
Let kA and kB denote the number of A-players and B-players in the neighborhood
of that randomly chosen B-player. As such, kA + kB = k. Because of the mean-field
approximation we replace the degree of any neighboring vertex by 〈knn〉, and the degrees
of A-players and B-players around the randomly chosen B-player by both 〈knn〉. We define
qnnX|Y ≡ qX|Y (〈knn〉, 〈knn〉). Degrees of neighboring vertices of the neighbors of any randomly
5
<knn>
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k
<knn> <knn>
<knn><knn>(a) (b)
Figure 2: : Mean-Field approximation. (a) A vertex with an arbitrary degree k is surrounded by vertices
with degree 〈knn〉. (b) A neighboring vertex with degree 〈knn〉 is also surrounded by vertices with degree
〈knn〉.
chosen vertex are 〈knn〉 as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). Thus, for example, the probability that
a neighbor of an A-player neighboring to the randomly chosen vertex is a B-player is given
by qB|A(〈knn〉, 〈knn〉) ≡ q
nn
B|A. Therefore, the expected fitness of A-players and B-players
adjacent to the chosen B-player, fA and fB, respectively, are given by
fA = 1− w + w
[
(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|Ax+ {(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|A + 1}y
]
, (6)
fB = 1− w + w
[
(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|Bz + {(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|B + 1}s
]
. (7)
The probability that the randomly chosen B-player changes the strategy from B to A is
then given by
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
. (8)
The probability that a randomly chosen B-player has kA A-players and kB B-players in
the neighborhood is given by
∑
kA+kB=k
k!
kA!kB!
(
qA|B(〈knn〉, k)
)kA (qB|B(〈knn〉, k))kB . (9)
Therefore, the probability that a B-player is randomly chosen and changes the strategy
from B to A, and consequently pA(k) increases by 1/N(k) is given by
Pr
(
△pA(k) =
1
N(k)
)
=pB(k)P (k)
∑
kA+kB=k
〈k〉!
kA!kB!
(
qA|B(〈knn〉, k)
)kA (qB|B(〈knn〉, k))kB
×
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
. (10)
Next, we consider the case where an A-player is randomly chosen and then the A-player
changes the strategy from A to B, and consequently pA(k) decreases by 1/N(k).
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The probability that an A-player with degree k is chosen is pA(k)P (k). Suppose that
around the randomly chosen A-player, there are kA A-players and kB B-players and the
probability that such a configuration occurs is given by
k!
kA!kB!
(
qA|A(〈knn〉, k)
)kA (qB|A(〈knn〉, k))kB (11)
The expected fitness of A-players and B-players adjacent to the randomly chosen A-player,
gA and gB, respectively, are given by
gA = 1− w + w
[
{(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|A + 1}x+ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|Ay
]
, (12)
gB = 1− w + w
[
{(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|B + 1}z + (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|Bs
]
. (13)
Thus the probability that the randomly chosen A-player changes strategy from A to B is
given by
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
. (14)
Therefore, the probability that an A-player is randomly chosen to update the strategy
and then changes the strategy from A to B, and consequently the probability of strategy
A with degree k decreases by 1/N(k) is given by
Pr
(
△pA(k) = −
1
N(k)
)
=pA(k)P (k)
∑
kA+kB=k
k!
kA!kB!
(
qA|A(〈knn〉, k)
)kA (qB|A(〈knn〉, k))kB
×
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
. (15)
Combining Eqs. (10) and (15), we have
d
dt
pA(k) =
1
N(k)
Pr
(
△pA(k) =
1
N(k)
)
−
1
N(k)
Pr
(
△pA(k) = −
1
N(k)
)
. (16)
Because the degree of any randomly chosen vertex is 〈k〉, thus the probability of strategy
A in the network is pA(〈k〉) in the mean-field approximation. Thus we have
d
dt
pA =
1
N(〈k〉)
P (〈k〉)pB
∑
kA+kB=〈k〉
(qA|B)
kA(qB|B)
kB
〈k〉!
kA!kB!
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
−
1
N(〈k〉)
P (〈k〉)pA
∑
kA+kB=〈k〉
(qA|A)
kA(qB|A)
kB
〈k〉!
kA!kB!
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
. (17)
Recall that qX|Y ≡ qX|Y (〈knn〉, 〈k〉).
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We also need to have E [△pnnA ], where p
nn
X ≡ pX(〈knn〉) is the probability of strategy A
in the neighborhood of a randomly chosen player. Substituting 〈knn〉 with k of Eq. (16),
we have
d
dt
pnnA =
1
N(〈knn〉)
P (〈knn〉)p
nn
B
∑
kA+kB=〈knn〉
(qnnA|B)
kA(qnnB|B)
kB
〈knn〉!
kA!kB!
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
−
1
N(〈knn〉)
P (〈knn〉)p
nn
A
∑
kA+kB=〈knn〉
(qnnA|A)
kA(qnnB|A)
kB
〈knn〉!
kA!kB!
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
. (18)
The fact that the set of equations is closed here is due to the mean-field approximation.
4. Dynamics of conditional probability
We then go on to the dynamics of conditional probabilities qA|A and q
nn
A|A. We again
use the mean-field approximation, replacing degree of any randomly chosen vertex by
〈k〉 and that of any adjacent vertex by 〈knn〉. First, we study the dynamics of qA|A ≡
qA|A(〈knn〉, 〈k〉).
We now study the case where qA|A increases. For this purpose, suppose that a B-
player is randomly chosen and then changes the strategy from B to A. Suppose that the
randomly chosen B-player is linked to kA A-players and kB B-players. The probability
that the B-player with this configuration is chosen is given by
pBP (〈k〉)
〈k〉
kA!kB!
(qA|B)
kA(qB|B)
kB . (19)
The probability that the randomly chosen B-player changes the strategy from B to A is
given by
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
. (20)
After the B-player changes the strategy, the conditional probability qA|A increases by
pA(〈k〉, t)qA|A(〈knn〉, 〈k〉)N(〈k〉)〈k〉Pnn(〈knn〉) + kA
pA(〈k〉, t+△t)N(〈k〉)〈k〉Pnn(〈knn〉)
− qA|A(〈knn〉, 〈k〉), (21)
because conditional probability qA|A(knn, k) is given by the number of linked pairs of an
A-player with degree 〈knn〉 and an A-player with degree k divided by the number of linked
pairs of an A-player with degree k and a player of any strategy with degree 〈knn〉. Using
the fact that pA changes of order O(w), which will be confirmed later, the above equation
becomes
kA
pAN(〈k〉)〈k〉
+O(w). (22)
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Next, we are going to study the case where qA|A decreases. Suppose that an A-player is
randomly chosen and the A-player has kA A-players and kB B-players in the neighborhood.
The probability that the A-player with such a configuration is chosen is
pAP (〈k〉)
〈k〉
kA!kB!
(qA|A)
kA(qB|A)
kB . (23)
The probability that the A-player changes the strategy from A to B is
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
. (24)
After the A-player changes the strategy, the conditional probability qA|A decreases by
kA
pAN(〈k〉)〈k〉
+O(w). (25)
Therefore, we have
d
dt
qA|A =
∑
kA+kB=〈k〉
kA
pA〈k〉N(〈k〉)
pBP (〈k〉)
〈k〉!
kA!kB!
(qA|B)
kA(qB|B)
kB
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
−
∑
kA+kB=〈k〉
kA
pA〈k〉N(〈k〉)
pAP (〈k〉)
〈k〉!
kA!kB!
(qA|A)
kA(qB|A)
kB
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
+O(w), (26)
Analogously, we will compute E[qnnA|A], where q
nn
A|A ≡ qA|A(〈knn〉, 〈knn〉).
d
dt
qnnA|A =
∑
kA+kB=〈knn〉
2kA
pnnA 〈knn〉N(〈knn〉)
pnnB P (〈knn〉)
〈knn〉!
kA!kB!
(qnnA|B)
kA(qnnB|B)
kB
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
−
∑
kA+kB=〈knn〉
2kA
pnnA 〈knn〉N(〈knn〉)
pnnA P (〈knn〉)
〈knn〉!
kA!kB!
(qnnA|A)
kA(qnnB|A)
kB
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
+O(w). (27)
The derivation is given in detail in Appendix A.
5. The System of Equations
We now simplify the master equations in Eqs. (17), (18), (26), and (27). Transforming
p˙A in Eq. (17), we have
d
dt
pA =
〈k〉 − 1
〈k〉N
pAB (Ixx+ Iby − Izz − Iss)w +O(w
2), (28)
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where
Ix ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|A(qA|A + qB|B) + qA|A,
Iy ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|A(qA|A + qB|B) + qB|B,
Iz ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|B(qA|A + qB|B) + qA|A,
Is ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|B(qA|A + qB|B) + qB|B,
(29)
while the conditional probability q˙A|A in Eq. (26) is transformed to
d
dt
qA|A =
1
〈k〉NpA
pAB
[
1 + (〈k〉 − 1){qA|B − qA|A}
]
+O(w). (30)
We confirmed that p˙A is of order O(w), whereas q˙A|A is of order O(w
0). To derive Eq. (28),
we used the mean-field relation
qX|Y pY = pXY = pY X = qY |XpX ; (31)
the reason why it holds is discussed in Appendix B. Owing to this relation the O(w0)
terms in Eq. (28) vanish.
Equations (18) and (27) lead to
d
dt
pnnA =
〈knn〉 − 1
〈knn〉N
pAB
(
Innx x+ I
nn
y y − I
nn
z z − I
nn
s s
)
w +O(w2), (32)
where
Innx ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|A(q
nn
A|A + q
nn
B|B) + q
nn
A|A,
Inny ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|A(q
nn
A|A + q
nn
B|B) + q
nn
B|B,
Innz ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
A|B(q
nn
A|A + q
nn
B|B) + q
nn
A|A,
Inns ≡ (〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
B|B(q
nn
A|A + q
nn
B|B) + q
nn
B|B,
(33)
and
d
dt
qnnA|A =
2
〈knn〉Np
nn
A
pAB
[
1 + (〈knn〉 − 1){q
nn
A|B − q
nn
A|A}
]
+O(w). (34)
We thus confirmed that p˙nnA is of order O(w) and q˙
nn
A|A is of order O(w
0). To derive Eq. (32),
we used the relation qnnX|Y p
nn
Y = pXY = q
nn
Y |Xp
nn
X . Owing to this relation the O(w
0) terms in
Eq. (32) vanish.
We now have the following system of equations:
p˙A = F1(pA, qA|A, q
nn
A|A)w +O(w
2),
p˙nnA = F2(p
nn
A , q
nn
A|A)w +O(w
2),
q˙A|A = F3(pA, qA|A, q
nn
A|A) +O(w),
q˙nnA|A = F4(p
nn
A , q
nn
A|A) +O(w),
(35)
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where the functions Fi are defined in Eqs. (28), (32), (30), and (34). The equations
of p˙ and p˙nn are of order O(w), whereas the equations of q˙A|A and of q˙
nn
A|A are of order
O(w0). Because w ≪ 1 meaning weak selection, the conditional probabilities qA|A and
qnnA|A converge to stationary values much faster than pA and p
nn
A do. Thus the system very
quickly converges to the slow manifold given by F3 = 0 and F4 = 0. Therefore, we assume
that the following equations always hold:
1 + (〈k〉 − 1){qA|B − qA|A} = 0,
1 + (〈knn〉 − 1){q
nn
A|B − q
nn
A|A} = 0.
(36)
Because the relations concerning the strategy pair, qX|Y pY = pXY = qY |XpX and
qnnX|Y p
nn
Y = pXY = q
nn
Y |Xp
nn
X , hold, the probabilities of strategies pA, pB, p
nn
A , and p
nn
B and
the conditional probabilities qA|A, qB|A, qB|B, qA|B, q
nn
A|A, q
nn
B|A, q
nn
B|B, and q
nn
A|B can be ex-
pressed in terms of pA, p
nn
A , qA|A, and q
nn
A|A. Further, using Eqs. (36), we can express the
conditional probabilities in terms of pA and p
nn
A . In other words, only pA and p
nn
A are
sufficient to express the other probabilities and conditional probabilities.
6. The condition of favoring cooperation
Remember that our concern is the dynamics of pA. We now approximate the dynamics
of pA as a diffusion process [32, 33]. Eliminating the conditional probabilities from Eqs. (36)
and using Eqs. (10, 15), we have the expectation value of △pA and the variance of △pA as
follows:
E[△pA] =
1
N(〈k〉)
Pr
(
△pA =
1
N(〈k〉)
)
−
1
N(〈k〉)
Pr
(
△pA = −
1
N(〈k〉)
)
≃
〈k〉 − 2
〈k〉(〈k〉 − 1)N
pA(1− pA) (αpA + βp
nn
A + γ)w△t
≡m(pA)△t, (37)
Var[△pA] =
(
1
N(k)
)2
Pr
(
△pA =
1
N(〈k〉)
)
+
(
−
1
N(〈k〉)
)2
Pr
(
△pA = −
1
N(〈k〉)
)
≃
2(〈k〉 − 2)
(〈k〉 − 1)NN(〈k〉)
pA(1− pA)△t ≡ v(pA)△t, (38)
where
α ≡ (x− y − z + s)(〈k〉 − 2), (39)
β ≡ (x− y − z + s)〈k〉(〈knn〉 − 2), (40)
γ ≡ (x− y − z + s) + (x− y)〈k〉+ 〈k〉〈knn〉(y − s). (41)
The dynamics of pA is approximated by the diffusion process with the drift m(pA) and the
variance v(pA) for unit time step △t.
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The fixation probability of strategy A, ρA(r), for the initial probability
pA(t = 0) = r, satisfies the following differential equation:
0 = m(r)
dρA(r)
dr
+
v(r)
2
d2ρA(r)
dr2
. (42)
Now, we use the Prisoner’s Dilemma pay-off matrix given by
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
. (43)
The differential equation (42) becomes
0 = (b− c〈knn〉)w
dρC(r)
dr
+
1
N(〈k〉)
d2ρC(r)
dr2
. (44)
Since w ≪ 1, ρC(1) = 1, and ρC(0) = 0, we have the solution of Eq.(44) in the form
ρC(r) ≈ r + w
N(〈k〉)
2
(b− c〈knn〉)r(1− r). (45)
As we discussed in section 2, the criterion that a network favors cooperation is ρC(1/N) >
1/N . Therefore, we have
b
c
> 〈knn〉. (46)
This is the condition that a network favors cooperation.
7. Intuition: Why is b/c > 〈k
nn
〉 the condition?
We present intuitive reasoning of why the condition for favoring cooperation is b/c >
〈knn〉. The point is that the mean degree of players competing for the vacant vertex is
〈knn〉. In the mean-field picture, any vertex is surrounded by vertices with degree 〈knn〉, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.
After we transform the second equation of Eq. (36), replacing A by C and B by D, and
using qnnC|D = 1− q
nn
D|D obtained from q˙
nn
C|C = 0, the equation becomes
(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
C|C = (〈knn〉 − 1)p
nn
C + p
nn
D , (47)
(〈knn〉 − 1)q
nn
C|D = (〈knn〉 − 1)p
nn
C − p
nn
C . (48)
Subtracting the second equation from the first one, we have
(〈knn〉 − 1)(q
nn
C|C − q
nn
C|D) = 1. (49)
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<knn>
<knn>
<knn>
<knn>
k
Figure 3: In the mean-field approximation for a network structure, the degrees of vertices adjacent to any
vertex are 〈knn〉.
C
V
D
Figure 4: A C-player and a D-player compete for a vacant vertex V. The degree of the vacant vertex is
arbitrary. The mean degrees of the C-player and the D-player are both 〈knn〉.
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Now, suppose that a C-player and a D-player compete for a vacant vertex V as illus-
trated in Fig. 4. Because the payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is given by
Eq. (43), the expected payoff from the game for a C-player, GnnC , and that of a D-player,
GnnD , are respectively, given by
GnnC = (b− c)q
nn
C|C(〈knn〉 − 1)− cq
nn
D|C(〈knn〉 − 1) + bδV,C − c (50)
GnnD = bq
nn
C|D(〈knn〉 − 1) + bδV,C, (51)
where V is either C or D. If GnnC − G
nn
D > 0 holds, the network favors cooperation. Using
(〈knn〉 − 1)(q
nn
C|C − q
nn
C|D) = 1, and q
nn
D|C = 1− q
nn
C|C in Eq. (49), we have
GnnC −G
nn
D > 0,
which yields
b
c
> 〈knn〉. (52)
Thus, if the condition b/c > 〈knn〉 is satisfied, cooperators are favored in the network.
In other words, we see from Eq. (49) that the C-neighbors of the vacant vertex V have,
on average, one more C neighbor among their 〈knn〉 other neighbors than the D-neighbors
of V do. This extra benefit b must outweigh the cost c〈knn〉 incurred by the C-neighbors
of V. Thus we must have b/c > 〈knn〉. In the example illustrated in Fig. 5, the C-neighbor
of the vacant vertex V has three cooperators as the neighbors, while the D-neighbor has
two cooperators. The payoff from the game of the cooperator, GC = 3b − c〈knn〉, must
outweigh that of the defector, GD = 2b. Thus, we have the condition (46).
C
V
D
C
C C
C
C
D
D
D
Figure 5: The C-neighbor has, on average, one more cooperator among their 〈knn〉 − 1 neighbors than the
D-neighbor does.
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8. Which networks favor cooperation the most and the least
Because our condition b/c > 〈knn〉 depends on 〈knn〉, we can see which of the three
representative networks, regular, random, and scale-free, favors cooperation the most and
the least. For this comparison purposes, we fix 〈k〉(≡ µ) for the three networks. Even
though 〈k〉 is the same, 〈knn〉 can be different.
In general, we have
〈knn〉 =
〈k2〉
〈k〉
=
σ2 + µ2
µ
. (53)
where σ2 is the variance of the degree distribution. For a regular network, 〈knn〉
regular = µ
since σ2 = 0. The degree distribution of a random network is Poisson. Because the mean
and the variance of Poisson distribution are the same, we have 〈knn〉
random = 〈k〉 + 1 for
a random network. Therefore, 〈knn〉
regular < 〈knn〉
random. A scale-free network is a network
in which the degree distribution P (k) follows P (k) ∼ k−γ typically with 2 < γ ≤ 3. The
mean degree of the nearest neighbors of a scale-free network of infinite size is
〈knn〉
scale-free =
〈k2〉
〈k〉
=
[∫ ∞
1
k2−γdk
] / [∫ ∞
1
k1−γdk
]
⇒∞
for 2 < γ ≤ 3. Thus, the inequality 〈knn〉
regular < 〈knn〉
random < 〈knn〉
scale-free holds for
almost all the cases of interest.
Among the three network classes, a regular network favors cooperation the most and
a scale-free network favors it the least. In an ideal scale-free network of infinite size and
with 2 < γ ≤ 3, cooperation is unfeasible because 〈knn〉
scale-free is infinite. Because of
Eq. (53), the network heterogeneity increases 〈knn〉. In other words, a heterogenous network
suppresses cooperation. The feature that the scale-free network suppresses cooperation is
seen in the numerical simulations in Ref. [1] and also agrees with Ref. [24]. However,
Refs. [21–23] claim that the scale-free network and the heterogenous network conversely
favors cooperation. This is probably because the rule of the games are different. Whether
or not the scale-free network and the heterogenous network favor cooperation depends on
the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation
irrespective of the rule of a game.
9. If the number of players are small, then the cooperation is favored
As is stated yet, scale-free networks are ubiquitously observed networks in the reality
and cooperation is widely observed in nature. We show that cooperation is not favored
in scale-free networks. You may think that they are contradicting. However, the key is
the number of players. The mean degree of the nearest neighbors 〈knn〉 increases with the
number of players in scale-free networks. Therefore, If the number of players are small,
then the mean degree of nearest neighbors is small, and then the cooperation is favored.
This would not be the case if the condition were determined by the mean degree 〈k〉, since
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the mean degree 〈k〉 is a fixed value determined by the exponent γ when the network
size N is large enough. We are considering typcial scale-free networks by which we mean
2 < γ ≤ 3.
10. Simulations
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Figure 6: Results of numerical simulations for random networks. The horizontal straight line is the
neutral probability 1/N . The x axis indicates b/c while the y axis indicates the fixation probability. The
vertical broken line indicates the points where b/c = 〈knn〉. (a)–(c) 〈k〉 = 6, 10, 14, the network size
N = 600, 600, 700, and w = 5× 10−3, 7× 10−3, 4× 10−3, respectively.
In the following, we show numerically that the condition (46) holds well, verifying our
approximations. We simulate the game on several networks with b/c set to different values.
The random networks are Erdos-Reyni random networks [34]. The scale-free networks are
made by a preferential attachment mechanism [35, 36]. In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, the x axis
indicates b/c, while the y axis does the fixation probability. The horizontal straight line
corresponds to the neutral probability given by 1/N . If a point is above the horizontal
line, the network favors cooperation by definition; if the point is below the horizontal line,
the network suppresses cooperation. The vertical broken line indicates the point where
b/c = 〈knn〉. Our condition holds exactly if a point falls onto the crossing of the horizontal
and vertical lines. Figure 6 and Fig. 7 show that for both random and scale-free networks,
our condition holds well.
We constructed the scale-free networks in the following way. First, we prepare a com-
plete network consisting of K vertices, in which all the vertices are connected to each other.
Next, a new vertex with m links enters into the existing network. The probability that the
new vertex is connected to an existing vertex i is ki+A∑
j(kj+A)
where ki is the degree of vertex
i. Next, another new vertex enters the exiting network in the same way. After repeating
this process, we have a scale-free network. As N gets large enough the exponent γ of the
degree distribution of the scale-free network asymptotically converges to γ = 3+A/m. In
the simulation, we use m = 〈k〉/2, K = m+1, N = 600, and A is such that 3+A/m = 7.5,
so that the exponent γ is 7.5.
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Figure 7: Results for numerical simulations of scale-free networks. (d)–(f) N = 600, w = 10−3, γ = 7.5,
and 〈k〉 = 6, 10, 16, 20, respectively.
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Figure 8: Comparison between random networks and scale-free networks. The random network is indicated
by circles; the scale-free network is indicated by crosses. The parameters are common: 〈k〉 = 10, N = 600,
and w = 10−3 for both networks. The exponent of scale-free network γ is 7.5. The y axis indicates the
fixation probability; the x axis indicates b/c.
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In Fig. 8, we compare the random and the scale-free networks. The network size
N , w, and the mean degree 〈k〉 are taken to be the same. The comparison shows that
random networks favor cooperation more than scale-free networks do, because the fixation
probabilities for random networks are greater for all the points.
11. Conclusion
We study the Prisoner’s Dilemma game where the payoff matrix is given by
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
, (54)
and analytically derive the condition of favoring cooperation for uncorrelated networks.
The game is done under a death-birth process with weak selection. In summary, we
obtained the following four results.
(i) Although it has been widely thought that b/c > 〈k〉 is the condition of favoring
cooperation, we show that b/c > 〈knn〉 is the condition. The mean degree of players com-
peting for a vacant vertex is 〈knn〉 and the fitness of these adjacent players are determined
by 〈knn〉; then, 〈knn〉 determines the outcome.
(ii) We show that among three representative networks, regular, random, and scale-free,
a regular network favors cooperation the most and a scale-free network the least. This is
because the condition depends on the mean degree of nearest neighbors, 〈knn〉. Whereas
the scale-free network has the largest mean degree of nearest neighbors, the regular network
has the least for the same value of the mean degree 〈k〉.
(iii) In an ideal typical scale-free network characterized by the infinite number of vertices
with γ ≤ 3, cooperation is unfeasible.
(iv) Although the scale-free network and the heterogeneous network favor cooperation
in some cases, they suppress cooperation in our case. The scale-free network does not
always favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure, although some occasionally
believe so. Whether the scale-free network enhances or diminishes cooperation depends on
details of the game.
(v) We show that if the number of players is small, then the cooperation is favored in
scale-free networks.
This would not be the case if the condition were determined by the mean degree 〈k〉,
since the mean degree 〈k〉 is a fixed value determined by the exponent γ when the network
size N is large enough.
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<knn> <knn><knn>k AB A
B
1 2 3 4
Figure A.9: Pairs of an A-player and a B-player in two situations.
Appendix A. The derivation of E[△qnn
A|A]
In the present appendix, we derive E[△qnnA|A] in Eq. (27). First, we are going to study
the case where qnnA|A increases. Suppose that a B-player with degree 〈knn〉 that is linked to
kA A-players and kB B-players in the neighborhood is randomly chosen. The probability
that an A-player is chosen is given by
pnnB P (〈knn〉)
〈knn〉
kA!kB!
qnnA|B
kAqnnB|B
kB , (A.1)
where pnnX ≡ pX(〈knn〉). The probability that the chosen B-player changes the strategy
from B to A is
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
. (A.2)
If the B-player changes the strategy from B to A, the conditional probability qnnA|A increases
by
2kA
pnnA N(〈knn〉)〈knn〉
+O(w), (A.3)
where we have used the fact that pnnA changes only of order w, which will be confirmed
later.
Note the factor 2 in the numerator of Eq. (A.3). We are going to explain the reason of
the factor in Fig. A.9. The conditional probability increases when a B-player on the vertex
1 changes the strategy from B to A and the player is linked to an A-player on the vertex
2. The point is that when both of the degrees of the vertex 1 and the vertex 2 are 〈knn〉,
the factor 2 appears. Let A1 denote the strategy A of the vertex 1 and A2 that of the
vertex 2. Thus, both of the pairs A1–A2 and A2–A1 resulting from the change of strategy
contribute to the increase in the conditional probability; one is seen from the vertex 1 and
the other is seen from the vertex 2. When the vertex 1 was a B-player, on the other hand,
the pair was B1–A1. In the case of qA|A(〈knn〉, 〈k〉), from the assumption that a randomly
chosen vertex has the degree 〈k〉 and the vertices adjacent to the randomly chosen one has
the degree 〈knn〉 the conditional probability would increase in one way seen from the vertex
with the degree 〈k〉 in Eq. (25).
19
Suppose that the vertex 1 changes the strategy from B to A; then the pairs of k and
〈knn〉 increases by one. On the other hand, suppose that the vertex 3 changes the strategy
from B to A; then the pairs of 〈knn〉 and 〈knn〉 increases by two. One is seen from the
vertex 3 to 4 and the other is seen from the vertex 4 to 3.
Next, we are going to study the case where qnnA|A decreases. Suppose that an A-player
with degree 〈knn〉 linked to kA A-players and kB B-players in the neighborhood is randomly
chosen to update the strategy. The probability that it happens is given by
pnnA P (〈knn〉)
〈knn〉
kA!kB!
(qnnA|A)
kA(qnnB|A)
kB . (A.4)
The probability that the randomly chosen A-player changes strategy from A to B is
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
. (A.5)
If the A-player changes the strategy from A to B, then the conditional probability qnnA|A
increases by
2kA
pnnA N(〈knn〉)〈knn〉
+O(w). (A.6)
We thus have Eq. (27):
d
dt
qnnA|A =
∑
kA+kB=〈knn〉
2kA
pnnA 〈knn〉N(〈knn〉)
pnnB P (〈knn〉)
〈knn〉!
kA!kB!
(qnnA|B)
kA(qnnB|B)
kB
kAfA
kAfA + kBfB
−
∑
kA+kB=〈knn〉
2kA
pnnA 〈knn〉N(〈knn〉)
pnnA P (〈knn〉)
〈knn〉!
kA!kB!
(qnnA|A)
kA(qnnB|A)
kB
kBgB
kAgA + kBgB
+O(w). (A.7)
Appendix B. The reason qX|Y pY = pXY = pY X = qY |XpX holds
In the present appendix, we argue the relation (31). The point is that in the mean-field
approximation the degree of any randomly chosen vertex is 〈k〉, that of any neighboring
degree is 〈knn〉, and that of a vertex attached to a randomly chosen link is also 〈knn〉.
Note also that qX|Y is the conditional probability between randomly chosen vertex and
its neighbor, and qnnX|Y is the conditional probability between vertices on both ends of a
randomly chosen link.
Pair probabilities are computed by two methods. In one method, we first choose a
vertex randomly and check the strategy X of the vertex. Then, we check the strategies of
all vertices linked to the chosen vertex. The conditional probability of finding a strategy
Y on another vertex is qY |X . This procedure is carried out iteratively for all N vertices.
Because every link is connected to two vertices and every pair is counted twice, in this
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method, we count 2L pairs in total, where L denotes the number of links in the network.
The pair probabilities computed by this method let us understand the relation qX|Y pY =
pXY = qY |XpX .
In the other method of computing pair probability, we first choose a link and check the
strategies of vertices of both ends of the chosen link. The probability of finding a strategy
X on one end is pnnX , and the conditional probability of finding a strategy Y on the other
end given that the strategy X is already found is qnnY |X . Then, we carry out this procedure
iteratively for all L links. In this method, we count L pairs in total. The pair probabilities
computed by this method let us understand the relation qnnX|Y p
nn
Y = pXY = q
nn
Y |Xp
nn
X . Because
of the mean-field relation qX|Y pY = pXY = qY |XpX , the O(w
0) term in Eq. (28) vanishes.
We also give another explanation of the relation qX|Y pY = qY |XpX . The pair probability
pXY is given by
pXY =
# of XY pairs
# of Links
=
∑
knn,k
qX|Y (knn, k)P (knn|k)kNp(k)pY (k)
N〈k〉
, (B.1)
and the pair probability pY X is given by
pY X =
# of Y X pairs
# of Links
=
∑
knn,k
qY |X(knn, k)P (knn|k)kNp(k)pX(k)
N〈k〉
. (B.2)
Further, the relation pXY = pY X holds. Therefore, the following equation holds:∑
knn,k
qX|Y (knn, k)P (knn|k)kNp(k)pY (k)
N〈k〉
= pXY (B.3)
= pY X =
∑
knn,k
qY |X(knn, k)P (knn|k)kNp(k)pX(k)
N〈k〉
. (B.4)
Because of the mean-field approximation we replace the degree of nearest neighbors knn by
〈knn〉 and the degree k by 〈k〉:
pXY =
∑
knn,k
qX|Y (knn, k)P (knn, k)p(k)pY (k)kN
N〈k〉
(B.5)
=
qX|Y pYN〈k〉
N〈k〉
= qX|Y pY . (B.6)
Therefore, pXY = qX|Y pY holds in the mean-field approximation. Similarly, pY X = qY |XpX
holds. Thus, qY |XpX = pY X = pXY = qX|Y pY holds in the mean-field approximation.
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